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Introduction
When people learn of a wrongdoing, they intuitively desire
that the wrongdoer be punished, even more so than they
desire that the victim be compensated (Van Prooijen,
2010). Why do third-party observers consider punishing
the wrongdoer so vital? According to the model of intuitive
prosecutors (Tetlock, 2002), people interpret wrongdoings
as threats to the normative order (Singh, Kaur, Junid, &
Self, 2011) that must be eliminated through punishment.
Further, strong punishment for any wrongdoingdbe it in
business, government, or the streetsdappears as headline
news in the media as illustrated at the outset of this
article.
Between the awareness of wrongdoing and the punish-
ment meted out to the wrongdoer, a number of variables
intervene: causal attributions (Singh & Lin, 2011; Tetlock,
Self, & Singh, 2010); anger (Singh & Lin, 2011; Tetlock
et al., 2007); blame (Singh & Lin, 2011; Tetlock et al.,
2007); and punishment goals of retribution (i.e., making
the offender atone for the harm done) and deterrence
(i.e., preventing future harm in the society) (Carlsmith,
2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Rucker,
Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Singh & Lin, 2011;
Tetlock et al., 2007). How, and in which order, do these
variables transmit the effects of independent variables
(IVs) of culture, circumstance of wrongdoing, and severity
of outcome on punishment?
The authors propose and test a causalemoral model of
punishment that is broadly consistent with previous artic-
ulations on this issue (Darley & Schultz, 1990; Hamilton &
Sanders, 1992). Our novelty lies in trying to (a) specify
the order in which causal attribution (i.e., did and would
the person cause it?) and moral responsibility (i.e., is he to
blame for the wrongdoing?) operate in determining legal
punishment, and (b) show how distal IVs influence punish-
ment via the proximal variables of causal attribution and
moral blame.
Our model has two postulates. First, causal attribution
and moral responsibility are distinct precursors of punish-
ment. Second, they are sequentially dependent: Disposi-
tional attribution to the wrongdoer (causal attribution to
him) leads to blame to him (moral responsibility) which, in
turn, determines the imprisonment recommended for him.
In our model, IVs determine punishment through one
of the three routes. First, their effects may be mediated
by causal attribution, leading to greater dispositional
attribution and blame to the wrongdoer. Second, their1 The effects of severity of outcome on punishment were mediated
by punishment goals of deterrence (Singh & Lin, 2011) and/or
retribution (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Tetlock et al.,
2007). Since there was no direct measure of punishment goals in
our experiment, we predict a direct effect of severity of outcome
on imprisonment in the present case.effects may be mediated by blame, not dispositional
attribution. Finally, the IVs may have direct impact on
punishment, without entailing causal or moral consider-
ation (although there may be other mediators such as
punishment goals). Given the previous literature in social
psychology cited earlier, we hypothesise that severity of
outcome is an example of a direct variable1 (Hypothesis
1); culture is an example of a variable mediated by
moral responsibility (Hypothesis 2); and circumstance of
the wrongdoing is an example of a variable mediated by
causal attribution (Hypothesis 3). We summarise our path
model in Fig. 1.2 Evidently, the three IVs of circumstance
of crime, culture of participants, and severity of outcome
for the victim are predicted to have additive effects on
the three responses that are themselves sequentially
dependent.
Hypothesis 1. came from the finding that the punishment
goal of deterrence, not dispositional attribution or blame to
the offender, mediated the main effect of severity of
outcome on the compensation and imprisonment recom-
mendations (Singh & Lin, 2011). In the absence of measures
of punishment goals, therefore, severity of outcome should
have a direct effect on imprisonment.
Hypothesis 2. came from the EasteWest differences in the
assignment of moral responsibility. Chinese blame wrong-
doers less than do Americans (e.g., Menon, Morris, Chiu, &
Hong, 1999; Singh, Simons, et al., 2011). However, “. the
typical East-West difference in causal attributions derive
primarily from East Asians’ relative sensitivity to situational
influences on behavior, not from their lack of dispositionist
beliefs” (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999, p. 57).
Finally, there are theoretical and empirical grounds for
predicting that the effect of circumstance should be
mediated by causal attribution. Both classic legal theories
(Hart, 1961) and attribution theory (Weiner, 1995) posit
that explanations of wrongdoing determine punishment. In
the culpable control model, moreover, internal-
controllable attributions justify punishment (Alicke,
2000). Although dispositional attribution or blame alone
mediated the main effects of circumstance on the impris-
onment and compensation recommendations, blame
emerged as the sole mediator when it was pitted against
other variables (Singh & Lin, 2011). Hence, placements of
dispositional attribution and blame between circumstance
and imprisonment are justified.
Punishment recommendation is driven by two goals
(Singh, Ramasamy, Self, Simons, & Lin, in press). One is
social control that safeguards the lives, properties, and
liberties of people (Singh, Kaur et al., 2011). Another isIn an initial experiment, we tested a path model by specifying
a direct effect of severity of outcome and the blame-mediated
effects of culture and circumstances on imprisonment. The fit of
the path model was excellent, c2(6)Z 1.77, pZ .94, non-normed
fit index (NNFI) Z 1.21, incremental fit index (IFI) Z 1.11, root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) Z .00, standardised
root mean residual (SRMR) Z .00, and highly encouraging for
undertaking a test of the full model.
Figure 1. The unstandardised path coefficients from the IVs
of circumstance leading to the crime, culture of the partici-
pants, and severity of outcome to the DV of imprisonment via
the MVs of dispositional attribution and blame. **p < .01
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extent it can be justified beyond doubt (Tetlock et al.,
2007). Our model allows moderation of the relationships
among the three key variables studied by how these goals
are temporarily activated. When social-control goals are
salient, for example, the variable such as circumstance of
crime that affects punishment indirectly through causal
attribution may be less influential than a direct variable
such as severity of outcome. By contrast, when the goal of
fairness to the wrongdoer is salient, the variables
affecting punishment via causal attribution may become
more important than the direct variable of severity of
outcome.
The foregoing possibility can explain the three-way
participants’ culture (Singaporean vs. American) circum-
stance (extenuating vs. non-extenuating) outcome
severity (severe vs. mild) interaction in punishment
(Tetlock et al., 2010). Singaporeans used only the severity
of outcome in punishment; Americans, by contrast, used
circumstance more than severity of outcome. As the
wrongdoer was described as belonging to a group of
confirmed criminals suffering from perpetual unemploy-
ment, drinking, and illegal money-making problems, he
might have been construed as a threat to the normative
order (Rucker et al., 2004) in Singapore but as a victim of
the society in the United States (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). If
so, the prosecutorial strategy of Singaporeans was exclu-
sively driven by the goal of social-control, whereas that of
Americans was driven more by the goal of fairness to the
offender than that of social-control. Providing a more
empathic description should eliminate such interaction and
produce the main effects that our model predicts.
We tested our model, using the same procedure as in
Tetlock et al. (2010). Singaporeans and Americans read
vignettes of a crime which varied with respect to extenu-
ating circumstances and outcome severity. To provide
a clearer test of the model, however, we made three
changes. First, the offenders were purportedly ordinary
citizens charged of crime for the first time to rectify
the possible culture/goal confound pointed above. Second,
the severity of outcome was reduced from previous tests
to more commonly encountered scenarios to enable
the participants engage themselves in motivated reasoning
(Tetlock et al., 2007) and hence make sharper
discrimination between various prosecutorial responses.
Finally, we measured the dispositional attribution, blame,
and imprisonment responses to the offender.Method
Participants
Fluent English-speaking undergraduate psychology students
from Singapore (48 women, 16 men) and the United States
(43 women, 21 men) participated to fulfil the requirements
of an introductory psychology course. Such participant
populations are ideal for forming randomised groups to
manipulate the causal factors and test causal models.
Responses were unanimous.
Stimuli
We prepared four crime vignettes in which an individual
person and his group of friends had been associated with an
unsuccessful crime of snatching an elderly lady’s handbag
at a public place. In the intentional condition, the offender
saw the elderly lady with an unattended handbag and
decided to snatch it. In the extenuating circumstance, the
group of friends dared the offender to snatch the handbag.
In the attempted theft, the lady resisted and was pushed
away by the offender. Consequently, she “. fell, sprained
her ankle, and received outpatient treatment at a nearby
clinic” (low severity) or “. fell, fractured her skull,
suffered serious concussion, and had to be hospitalised”
(high severity).
The foregoing scenario vignettes were well-suited for
answering the theoretical questions raised. They matched
well with the news reports that often appear in print
media, describing the circumstance leading to a crime and
its consequence for the victim. Equally important, they
were consistent with the method of the studies performed
within the social-functionalist paradigm (Rucker et al.,
2004; Singh & Lin, 2011; Tetlock et al., 2007, 2010).
Design
The design was a 2  2  2 (Circumstance leading to the
crime: Intentional vs. extenuating  Severity of outcome:
Low vs. high  Culture: Chinese in Singapore vs. European
Americans in the United States) between-participants
factorial. While the first two factors were presented
randomly, culture was a quasi-experimental factor. Thus,
participants from both cultures were randomly assigned to
the four cells formed by the stimulus design of Circumstance
leading to the crime Severity of outcome (nsZ 16 per cell).
Procedure
In a study of citizens’ reactions to crime reports, partici-
pants read one of four vignettes in English, and answered
five questions. Three questions measured dispositional
attribution to the offender (“How likely is it that the crime
would have happened if the offender had not been with his
group of friends?”; “How likely is it that the offender would
behave in the same way in the future?”; and, “How likely is
it that the offender would behave in the same way in any
future crime?”). Responses ranged from 0 (not all likely) to
9 (almost certainly).
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responsibility or blame to the offender (0 Z very little;
9 Z complete responsibility or blame) and the recom-
mendation of imprisonment for him according to the law
(0 Z minimum possible period; 9 Z maximum possible
period ).3 Responses were unanimous.
After collecting the completed surveys, we described
the purpose of the study and debriefed the participants.
Results
Reliability and correlation coefficients
Responses to the three attribution items formed a reliable
scale (Cronbach alpha Z .73); those to the blame and
imprisonment items, however, did not do so
(SpearmaneBrown Z .46). Thus, we formed a composite
measure of dispositional attribution, but retained blame
and imprisonment as separate responses.
Dispositional attribution to the offender correlated
positively with blame to him, r(126) Z .40, and with
imprisonment for him, r(126) Z .27, p < .01. The correla-
tion between the blame and imprisonment responses was
positive, r(126)Z .30, p < .01. Given the previous evidence
for the distinction among these three constructs (Singh
et al., in press) and the seemingly low correlations among
the present three responses also, we treated them as
correlated but distinct constructs.
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3
We performed separate analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the
three responses. All the interaction effects were nonsignifi-
cant, Fs(1, 120) 1.41, ps .24, h2ps .01, agreeingwith our
predictions of the additive effects of the three IVs on the
responses taken. The relevant means are listed in Table 1.
There was a significant main effect of severity of
outcome on imprisonment, F(1, 120) Z 12.53, p Z .001,
h2p Z .10, but not on dispositional attribution, F(1,
120)Z 0.14, pZ .71, or blame, F(1, 120)Z 0.16, pZ .69.
So, we accepted Hypothesis 1 that severity is a direct
causal variable in imprisonment.
Singaporeans, relative to Americans, blamed the offender
less, F(1, 120)Z 10.37, pZ .002, h2p Z .08. However, there
was no cultural difference in dispositional attribution to the
offender, F(1, 120)Z 0.06,pZ .81, or imprisonment for him,
F(1, 120)Z 0.08, pZ .78. Thus, we accepted Hypothesis 2
that culture is a variable mediated by moral responsibility.
Results also supported Hypothesis 3. The main effect of
circumstance was significant for dispositional attribution,
F(1, 120) Z 24.32, p < .001, h2p Z .17, and blame, F(1,
120)Z 7.05, pZ .009, h2p Z .06, but not for imprisonment,
F(1, 120) Z 0.08, p Z .78. Both of the hypothesised
mediating responses were higher when the crime was3 Participants made similar responses to the group of friends.
4 For mediation analysis, it is not necessary to have significant
effects of all the IVs on the dependent variable (DV). The causal
effects of the IVs on the DV may be transmitted through the
mediating variables (MVs) if they are somehow influenced by the
IVs (MacKinnon, 2008).committed intentionally than under an extenuating
circumstance.4 More important, the effect size of circum-
stance on dispositional attribution was nearly three times
larger than that on blame.
Path model
We coded Americans, intentional crime, and high severity
as 1, and Singaporeans, extenuating circumstance crime,
and low severity as 0. To test the model, we used simul-
taneous equation modelling (SEM) with AMOS. As Fig. 1
shows, all path coefficients were statistically significant,
ps < .01. More important, the fit of the model to the data
was excellent, c2(10) Z 7.91, p Z .64, NNFI Z 1.04,
IFI Z 1.02, RMSEA Z .00, SRMR Z .04.
In SEM analyses, many models may fit the same data
(MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993). To elim-
inate such possibilities, we constructed two new models. In
the first, we placed blame before dispositional attribution.
The fit of the model was poor, c2(10) Z 28.31, p Z .002,
NNFI Z .64, IFI Z .78, RMSEA Z .12, SRMR Z .08. In the
second, we placed imprisonment before blame. Again, the
fit was poor, c2(10) Z 22.50, p Z .01, NNFI Z .75,
IFI Z .85, RMSEA Z .10, SRMR Z .09. Hence, we accepted
our causalemoral model of imprisonment.
Severity effect on responsibility judgments
Past studies reported the main effect of severity of
outcome on responsibility judgments (e.g., Alicke, 2000;
Burger, 1981; Tetlock et al., 2007) that we did not find on
blame. To explain this anomaly, we formed a composite
measure of responsibility by averaging the blame and
imprisonment responses. In ANOVA, there was a significant
main effect of severity of outcome, F(120)Z 5.25, pZ .02,
h2p Z .04, a nonsignificant effect of circumstance leading to
the crime, F(120) Z 2.39, p Z .12, h2p Z .02, and
a marginally significant main effect of culture,
F(120) Z 3.36, p Z .07, h2p Z .04. On the one hand, this
measure uncovered the well-known severity effect on
responsibility judgments. On the other hand, it concealed
both the culture and circumstance effects on blame that
are foundations of our causalemoral model.
Discussion
Findings provide excellent support for our new model of
imprisonment. First, the different patterns of effects of the
three IVs on the dispositional attribution, blame, and
punishment responses highlight the importance of treating
them as distinct constructs. Second, the better fit of our
causalemoral path model relative to the two alternative
path models and the result that culture affected blame
(Menon et al., 1999; Singh et al., in press), but not dispo-
sitional attribution (Choi et al., 1999), confirm the pre-
dicted order of causation. Evidently, dispositional
attribution and blame are distinct constructs, and causa-
tion runs from the former to the latter and eventually to
the imprisonment recommended.
Our model integrates previous findings and accommo-
dates a range of distal variables within the causal-
Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations (SDs) of responses to the offender in intentional versus extenuating circumstance, low
versus high severity of outcome, and Singaporean versus American cultures.
Responses to the offender Circumstance of crime Severity of outcome Culture
Intentional Extenuating Low High Singaporean American
Imprisonment 5.25
(2.20)
5.14
(2.29)
4.52b
(2.35)
5.88a
(2.29)
5.14
(2.26)
5.25
(2.23)
Blame 7.98a
(1.80)
7.25b
(1.63)
7.67
(1.78)
7.56
(1.50)
7.17b
(1.80)
8.06a
(1.34)
Dispositional attribution 5.72a
(1.54)
4.22b
(1.81)
5.03
(1.80)
4.92
(1.88)
4.94
(1.75)
5.01
(2.09)
Note. The values in the parentheses are the corresponding SDs. The row means with different superscripts for the levels of a factor differ
significantly at p Z .05, ns Z 64.
Causalemoral model 77mediated, moral-mediated, and direct framework. This
success of the model is an excellent basis for clarifying
previous findings (Tetlock et al., 2007, 2010) and moving
ahead with future research. Considered from this vantage
point, our main contribution lies in specifying the precise
causal orders of the variables leading to imprisonment.
Our central goal was to test the causalemoral model
of punishment in which attribution leads to blame which,
in turn, determines the punishment recommended for
a wrongdoer. For the sake of comparability of methods
used in previous studies, we employed similar vignettes
of a street crime. Evidence for our hypothesised model
and against the alternative path models indicate the
validity of the method adopted. Given the evidence for
similar psychological processes underlying reactions to
organisational wrongdoings (Zemba, 2006; Zemba, Young,
& Morris, 2006) and crimes in society at large (Hamilton &
Sanders, 1992), we further contend that responses to
even organisational wrongdoings can be represented by
the same causalemoral model. Nevertheless, it will be
desirable to include vignettes of both organisational and
societal wrongdoings in future work on the model.
One implication of the results is that the stronger effect
of severity of outcome, relative to intention, is prudent
prosecution (Tetlock, 2002), not a cognitive bias or
heuristic. Had we only measured imprisonment, the main
effect of severity of outcome and null effect of circum-
stance could have been interpreted as errors, biases, or
heuristics in social cognition (Gilovich, Griffin, &
Kahneman, 2002): People use severity of outcome as
a basis for dispositional attribution (Burger, 1981) when
situation is an equally viable cause (Gilbert & Malone,
1995; Ross, 1977). Contrary to such interpretations, the
severity of outcome influenced imprisonment directly and
circumstance of the crime affected imprisonment first via
dispositional attribution and then via blame. Stated
differently, the former had a direct pathway to imprison-
ment; the latter, in contrast, had an indirect effect
through dispositional attribution and then blame. These
pathways agree with a social-control strategy (Tetlock
et al., 2007) in which intuitive prosecutors engage them-
selves in analytic thoughts and behaviourally close the
loopholes in the accountability procedure exploited
(Tetlock, 2002).
At the methodological level, our model buttresses the
importance of investigating different causal orders forthe different IVs by using the separate measures of disposi-
tional attribution, blame, and punishment. When we ignored
the difference between moral and legal responsibility, the
severity effect was as strong in our data as in the extant
literature (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Burger, 1981; Tetlock et al.,
2007). When we drew a distinction between blame and
punishment, we uncovered that both dispositional attribution
and culture influence punishment through moral responsi-
bility. By separating moral responsibility from legal punish-
ment, therefore, we have moved beyond an undifferentiated
responsibility construct of attributional punitiveness (Tetlock
et al., 2007) and specified the distinct causal, moral, and
direct pathways to legal action against wrongdoers.
Our model and findings have two implications for global
organisations and markets. One is for providing a new
perspective on why the same action that can be construed
as right in one culture may be construed as wrong (or less
right) in another culture (Mazar & Agrawal, 2011). Given
the facts that the physical locations and employees of
global organisations are distributed across the world and
their products and services are sold universally, morally
mediated punishment for scams, frauds, waste, and
endangering environment, to mention a few, across
cultures would be different.
Another implication is for the understanding of whistle
blowing (Alford, 2001). Those who highlight wrongdoings by
government, management, and outsourcing agencies in the
media are intuitive prosecutors driven by the goal of
upholding normative order, not trouble-makers seeking
mere pleasure. Further, those whistle blowers may be
engaging themselves in analytic thoughts and assignment of
culturally appropriate level of moral blame before desiring
that the wrongdoer be somehow punished. Such process-
tracing is possible by the model tested in this research.
Therefore, the authors hope that the present research will
draw the attention of management scholars to the poten-
tial of the causalemoral model in offering a new view on
how people around the globe react to wrongdoings in
organisations, markets, and societies.Role of the funding source
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